讲座预告 | 暨南经院经济学Seminar第271期:邝仲弘(中国人民大学)

发布者:余璐尧发布时间:2023-05-05浏览次数:170

主题Contingent Prizes and Non-exhausted Budget in Dynamic Multi-battle Contests

主讲人:邝仲弘(中国人民大学)

主持人:杨仁琨 暨南大学

时间2023427日(周四)上午1030-1200

地点:暨南大学石牌校区经济学院大楼(中惠楼)102

 

摘要

We investigate the effort-maximizing design in repeated contests between two players, including a preliminary and a final. In the standard Tullock framework, the optimal design takes the following form: One player obtains the entire prize if he wins both matches; if no such player exists, the loser in the final receives nothing, while the winner receives a portion of the prize. This structure remains optimal even when contestants are heterogeneous, with the optimal rule favoring the weaker player. We also demonstrate that introducing contingent prizes and a slack budget constraint can mitigate the well-known strategic momentum/discouraging effect.

 

主讲人简介

邝仲弘,中国人民大学经济学院助理教授,数字经济研究中心研究员,企业与组织理论研究中心研究员,经济理论读书班组织者,研讨会协调人。主要研究领域包括博弈论、信息经济学、产业组织理论等。发表主要作者论文7篇,另有文章在Journal of Economic TheoryR&R)、EconometricaTheoretical EconomicsEconomic Journal等期刊外审中。主持国家自然科学基金青年基金,参与两项国家自然科学基金重大项目。

 

编辑|麦嘉杰

初审|李仲达

审核|郑贤

  (来源:暨南大学经济学院微信公众号)