主题：Neologism-proofness and optimal communication design
主讲人：李明 加拿大康考迪亚大学
主持人：杨仁琨 暨南大学
时间：2025年11月3日（周一）上午10:00-11:30
地点：暨南大学石牌校区经济学院大楼（中惠楼）305室
摘要
We investigate equilibrium selection in cheap-talk games. We show that under optimal communication design, the most informative equilibrium is the unique equilibrium that satisfies neologism-proofness. Our study provides a new justification for focusing on the most informative equilibrium in cheap-talk games.
主讲人简介
Dr. Ming Li is Professor of Economics at Concordia University. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has published his research in top economics journals including Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, and Journal of Public Economics. Dr. Li's main research interests are in the fields of game theory, information economics, and political economy. His research has been funded by multiple SSHRC and FRQSC grants. He has refereed for top general interest and theory journals in economics.
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校对| 杨仁琨
责编| 彭毅
初审| 李仲达
终审发布| 何凌云
（来源：暨南大学经济学院微信公众号）
