主题：Group Rationality and Group Stable Equilibrium
主讲人：温泉 美国华盛顿大学
主持人：杨仁琨 暨南大学
时间：2025年3月10日（周一）下午15:00
地点：暨南大学石牌校区经济学院大楼（中惠楼）102室
摘要
In a repeated game, a strategy profile is group stable with respect to some groups of players if it is immune to deviations by any of these groups. Accordingly, a subgame perfect equilibrium is stable with respect to all single-player groups. We introduce the concept of group rationality, which is an extension of individual rationality from single-player groups to multi-player groups. For a collection of groups, a group stable equilibrium outcome must be feasible and weakly group rational for these groups. On the other hand, any feasible and strictly group rational payoff vector can be supported by a group stable equilibrium when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one, a folk theorem result for group stable equilibrium.
主讲人简介
温泉，华盛顿大学Robert R. Richards经济学教授。1991年获西安大略大学经济学博士学位。研究方向为博弈论、微观经济学理论。论文发表在Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, Rand Journal of Economics, International Economics Review等期刊。
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校对|杨仁琨
责编|彭毅
初审|王贤彬
终审发布|何凌云
（来源：暨南大学经济学院微信公众号）
