论文1内容摘要：This article examines the impact of foreign shareholdings on agency costs of Chinese firms from 2006 to 2012. The empirical results indicate that: (1) direct foreign shareholdings, in contrast to indirect foreign shareholdings, improve asset utilization, suggesting low agency costs; (2) qualified foreign institutional investors play a significant role in firms because they are less subject to political pressure, which is consistent with lower agency costs, but this effect could be eroded by government control; and (3) foreign shareholdings reduce the cost of equity and improve firm performance. The results contribute to the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the domestic/foreign ownership structure of firms.
论文2内容摘要：利用中国上市银行2010年8月19日至2017年3月31日的股票交易数据，采用分位数回归和LASSO算法，构建了上市银行尾部风险网络，同时使用滚动时间窗口法，分析了网络的动态关联性和拓扑结构。在此基础上，实证检验了上市银行尾部风险网络的关联性对系统性风险的影响。结果表明，银行尾部风险网络关联性与系统性风险显著正相关。虽然个体银行的尾部风险溢出会降低自身的风险承担水平，但同时也显著增强了银行网络的关联性，从而提高了系统性风险的整体水平。同时，我国上市银行尾部风险网络存在较明显的时变特征，在风险积聚过程和经济下行期间，其关联性显著增强。另外，大型国有银行在整个银行网络中居中心地位，具有较强的尾部风险溢出效应。
