主题：Certification Design in Lemon Market
主讲人：裴挺华 中科技大学
主持人：赵文博 暨南大学
时间：2025年5月23日（周五）上午9:00-10:30
地点：暨南大学石牌校区经济学院大楼（中惠楼）323室
摘要
We analyze certification design by a profit-maximizing certifier in the classic lemons market, where certification entails a flexible signal and a flat, upfront fee. Sellers privately observe the quality of their goods, which influences both buyers’ valuations and the sellers’outside options. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the set of implementable payoffs for participating sellers. Applying this result, we characterize the equilibrium of the certification market. We establish a necessary and sufficient condition under which the certifier can extract the full trade surplus. In general cases, we provide applications showing that the presence of a profit-maximizing certifier does not, in general, guarantee full seller participation or efficient trade.
主讲人简介
裴挺，华中科技大学经济学院讲师。新加坡国立大学经济系博士。研究兴趣为博弈论、微观经济理论等；论文发表在国际顶尖学术期刊Games and Economic Behavior和International Journal of Game Theory，主持国家自然科学青年基金。
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校对|赵文博
责编| 彭毅
初审| 李仲达
终审发布| 何凌云
（来源：暨南大学经济学院微信公众号）
